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André van Hoorn

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Workplace inclusion; ingroup; outgroup; management practices; work experience; discrimination; diversity management; human resource management

How Are Migrant Employees Managed? An Integrated Analysis

Abstract

I integrate theories of acculturation, statistical discrimination and social distance with social identity theory to propose a comprehensive theoretical framework that accounts for the differential managerial treatment of social groups. I develop and apply this framework to study the extent to which migrant employees are managed differently than native employees are and to unpack differentials in managerial treatment between specific migrant groups. Hallmark of the framework is that it considers group membership as well as traits of the social group to which an employee belongs and the fluidity of group boundaries. I predict that migrants receive different managerial treatment than natives do but that this difference diminishes with acculturation. I further predict that the level of economic development of migrants' home country and home-host country (dis)similarities explain differentials in managerial treatment between migrant groups. In a sample comprising up to 13,628 migrants from more than 160 home countries and focusing on job autonomy as a key feature of how employees are managed or supervised, I find strong empirical support for these predictions. This paper helps understand the mechanisms and factors that bias employers to make suboptimal use of human capital resources drawn from a cross-culturally diverse workforce.

INTRODUCTION

The way in which an employee is managed or supervised is a most basic feature of his/her work experience. Moreover, differential managerial treatment of individuals based on membership of social groups, i.e., discrimination, has important consequences, signaling that organizations make suboptimal use of available human capital resources and contributing to social inequality as well as making employers liable to lawsuits (Arrow, 1972; Wright, Ferris, Hiller & Kroll, 1995; Lee, Pitesa, Thau, & Pillutla, 2015). Nevertheless, the extensive literature on workforce diversity and workplace inclusion (Cox, 1994; Milliken & Martins, 1996; Williams, & O'Reilly, 1998; Brief, 2008; Shore et al., 2009; Mor Barak, 2013) has not generated much insight on the quintessential question of whether and to what extent organizations manage their employees differentially based on membership of social groups. Past work has revealed race-related differentials in workplace support and sponsorship (Greenhaus, Parasuraman, & Wormley, 1990; James, 2000). Similarly, there have been many studies of group differences in post-hiring employee outcomes, not least performance evaluations (Kraiger & Ford, 1985; Roberson, Galvin, & Charles, 2007; Pearce & Xu, 2012). Typically, however, this body of research shies away from considering concrete managerial practices as they are applied to different social groups in society. In addition, considered social groups tend to be narrowly focused on gender and black/white dichotomies, neglecting massive migratory trends and radical shifts in the birth-country composition of workforces worldwide (Castles, de Haas, & Miller, 2014; Lillie, Çaro, Berntsen, & Wagner, 2014). In the US, for instance, the foreign-born population has increased from 5.4% to 12.9% in the last 50 years and the percentage of European migrants decreased from 75% to 12% in favor of migrants from Asia and Latin America (Grieco et al., 2012) (see Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations, 2013 and

OECD, 2015 for data on similar trends elsewhere). Still, though, we simply know very little about how and why individuals with different national-cultural backgrounds may be subject to different managerial practices.

To fill this gap, in this paper I develop an integrated theoretical framework of the differential managerial treatment of social groups. The theoretical perspective with most obvious relevance to my analysis is social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) (or social identity-based faultlines theory [Lau & Murnighan, 1998]), which I complement with ideas from acculturation theory (Berry, 1997). Moreover, to move beyond narrowly defined, dichotomous group memberships (men versus women, blacks versus whites), I add insights from theories of statistical discrimination (Arrow, 1972; Aigner & Cain, 1977) and social distance (Bogardus, 1925; Karakayali, 2009), which allow me to make a more fine-grained distinction between social groups. Key feature of the resulting framework is that it considers the role of group membership but also the role of aggregate-level traits of the group to which an employee belongs and the fluidity of group boundaries or faultlines. Specifically, following social identity theory, I predict that group membership—belonging to the employer's ingroup or not—is a key determinant of the managerial treatment that an employee receives. However, my extension is to add a role for acculturation (adapting to and adopting traits from the employer's ingroup), which works to make the initial ingroup/outgroup boundary more diffuse and diminish the effect of outgroup membership on managerial treatment. Moreover, incorporation of statistical discrimination and social distance theories enables me to unpack the sources of differentials in managerial treatment between a large number of distinct social groups.

As indicated, the main motivation for developing this integrated framework of differential managerial treatment of social groups is to use it to analyze and present systematic empirical

evidence on the managerial treatment of migrants vis-à-vis natives and of various migrant groups in society, specifically groups of migrants born in different home countries. In the empirical part of my analysis, I focus on one specific managerial practice, namely the amount of job autonomy that an employee has. The reason for this focus is that job autonomy is a key feature of how employees are managed (Turner & Lawrence, 1965; Breaugh, 1985) and plays a prominent role in studies of, for instance, employee motivation (Spector, 1986; Gagné & Deci, 2005), self-managing teams (Kirkman & Rosen, 1999; Langfred, 2004), and job quality (Green, 2006; Gallie, 2007). The data that I use are collected as part of the European Social Survey or ESS, which has the important advantage that my empirical findings have high ecological validity and real-life significance.[1] The specific sample that I am able to consider comprises up to 13,628 individual migrants and 151,834 individuals in total, living in 32 mostly European host or destination countries. Most distinctively, the migrants in this sample originate from more than 160 home countries and typically comprise more than 1,250 home-host country dyads. The results of my empirical analysis confirm the relationships and differentials predicted by the theoretical framework. On average, migrant employees have less job autonomy than native employees have, but acculturation, specifically increased time spent in the host country, correlates positively with the amount of job autonomy that a migrant employee has. Considering differentials between various groups of migrants defined by their home country, both home-

[1] On the other hand, a disadvantage of using data on real-life outcomes of migrants and natives is that, compared to a laboratory setting, there are more confounding influences. However, in my empirical analysis, I include an extensive set of control variables to address possible biases due to such confounders.

country level of economic development and home-host country distance or (dis)similarities, notably shared language, are found to explain part of the variation in job autonomy between these groups. I conclude that the evidence supports my proposed theoretical framework and that, when it comes to diversity of national-cultural backgrounds, workplace inclusion is far from completed. My findings are relevant both for managerial practice, as differentiation based on social group membership is bound to lead to suboptimal use of available human capital resources, and for society at large, as social inequality appears to extend beyond traditional labor market outcomes (Arrow, 1972; Aigner & Cain, 1977; Pager & Shepherd, 2008; Lang & Lehmann, 2012; Lee et al., 2015) all the way to what people experience at their place of work.

This paper makes two key contributions. First, I present the first-ever, cross-national quantitative evidence on the managerial treatment of migrants and specific groups of migrants. On the waves of growing workforce diversity, much time and effort has been devoted to studying the causes and consequences of workplace diversity (Cox, 1994; Milliken & Martins, 1996; Williams, & O'Reilly, 1998; Brief, 2008; Shore et al., 2009; Mor Barak, 2013). However, this literature has been largely silent on the role of group membership in shaping the way in which an individual is managed. This paper fills this gap, presenting rich empirical evidence for a uniquely culturally diverse cross-national sample. Second, this paper provides comprehensive understanding of differentials in managerial treatment between social groups. The existing literature on workforce diversity and workplace inclusion is dominated by classic theories emphasizing group dichotomies (Allport, 1954; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). My theoretical framework, as well as the empirical evidence supporting it, in contrast, show the importance of a variety of other factors and mechanisms not considered in an integrated manner in the extant literature. When it comes to workplace discrimination, the idea of social group dichotomies

should only be a starting point and valuable lessons can be learned by those researchers and practitioners that take a more comprehensive perspective and consider such influences as group-level traits and intergroup (dis)similarities as factors shaping employers' decisions of how to manage (some of) their employees.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES

In this section, I develop my theoretical framework. In four subsections, I draw on a variety of theories and derive four propositions on how social group membership affects the managerial treatment that an employee receives. The subsections progress from a relative coarse understanding of the effect of dichotomous social group membership on the way an employee is managed in the first subsection to a more detailed unpacking of the factors and mechanisms underlying differentials in managerial treatment of a large number of distinct social groups in later subsections. In each of the four subsections, I also formulate hypotheses that apply the theoretical framework to study the managerial treatment of migrants vis-à-vis natives and of different migrants groups. Table 1 provides a summary of this section in terms of predicted relationships, which are subject of empirical testing later on.

<< Insert Table 1 about here >>

Social Categorization, Ingroup/Outgroup Membership, and Managerial Treatment

The main theoretical backdrop to my integrated analysis of differentials in managerial treatment is social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). The hallmark of this theory is the idea that

individuals classify themselves and others into different social groups or categories on the basis of certain salient individual characteristics (Fiske, 2000; Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000). A typical group classification is to distinguish between an "ingroup" and an "outgroup," where the distinction is based on similarity between the individual and other individuals on some easily observable characteristic(s). The effect of social group membership on managerial treatment derives from the fact that people tend to perceive and interact with ingroup and outgroup members differently, including generic ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002). Such intergroup biases, in turn, find organizational expression in, for instance, selection decisions (Lee et al., 2015) but also the assigning of employees to pleasurable versus unpleasurable job tasks, the allocation of overtime, et cetera. Overall, I propose the following effect of social group membership, specifically ingroup/outgroup membership, on managerial treatment (P1):

Proposition 1. Employees that do not belong to their employer's ingroup are managed differently than employees belonging to this ingroup are.

As stated, the empirical application of the theoretical framework that I develop in this paper concerns migrant and native employees and focuses on job autonomy as a key feature of the way in which an employee is managed. Starting with P1, I thus translate all my propositions into hypotheses that have variation in job autonomy as the dependent variable or phenomenon to be explained. In much the same fashion, for my empirical analysis, I follow the standard, intergroup approach to migrant discrimination applied by (social) psychologists, which involves classifying natives as ingroup members and migrants as outgroup members (e.g., Lee & Fiske, 2006; Dietz,

2010). This approach also fits the large literature finding that national identity and ethnicity (or national-cultural background more broadly) are common criteria for group membership (Barth, 1969; Fiske, 2000; Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000).

Following the argument underlying P1 concerning group membership and differential managerial treatment in general, I expect that employers typically have a less favorable attitude towards and opinion of migrant employees compared to native employees, ceteris paribus. And that, as such, employers are less willing to grant autonomy to migrant employees than to native employees. I further expect ingroup/outgroup trust differentials to play a role, as granting an employee autonomy means that the employer relinquishes some of his/her power to monitor and coerce the employee into acting in the employer's best interest (Langfred, 2004; Bloom, Sadun, & Van Reenen, 2012; Van Hoorn, 2013, 2014b). As it turns out, trust research indeed finds that people put much more trust into individuals belonging to the ingroup than into individuals belonging to the outgroup (Fukuyama, 1995; Delhey, Newton, & Welzel, 2011; Van Hoorn, 2014a), providing further reason to expect that employers grant less autonomy to migrant employees than they do to native employees. In summary, I propose the following relationship between an employee's migrant status and the amount of job autonomy that he/she has (H1):

Hypothesis 1. Migrant employees have less job autonomy than otherwise comparable native employees have.

Acculturation and the Fluidity of Social Group Boundaries

While the distinction between ingroup and outgroup members provides a useful starting point for

thinking about the effect of group membership on managerial treatment, this coarse dichotomy does not do justice to the (employee-level) heterogeneity that can be observed within these two groups. A generic concern is that individuals tend to belong to multiple social groups at the same time, always ending up in somebody's ingroup and someone else's outgroup (Stangor, Lynch, Duan, & Glas, 1992; Crisp & Hewstone, 2007). A more specific concern is that we can understand the role of group membership in managerial treatment better if the ingroup/outgroup distinction is seen as a continuum rather than a strict dichotomy. Social or group boundaries, not least those associated with ethnicity or national-cultural background, are not set in stone but fluid (Omi & Winant, 1994; Saperstein & Penner, 2012). Hence, individual employees may exhibit varying degrees of belonging to either their employer's ingroup or their employer's outgroup.

Exactly what degree of belonging to the ingroup a prototypical outgroup member exhibits or is able to achieve depends on a range of factors. A concept that seems particularly relevant to this issue is acculturation (Berry, 1980, 1997). Acculturation refers to the process of cultural change that occurs when individuals from different cultural groups come into continuous contact with one another (Redfield, Linton, & Herskovits, 1935, pp. 145-6). Strictly speaking, acculturation is a bidirectional process involving changes to the culture of both groups involved. In practice, however, most acculturation research focuses on unidirectional effects concerning minority groups, particularly migrants, adapting to and adopting traits from the majority or socially dominant group in society. A key dependent variable in this literature subsequently is how well migrants (or other such minority groups) adapt to the culture of the dominant social group in their host country. Similarly, an important consequence of acculturation is that, by adapting to become more similar to the members of the other group, the initial boundary between an individual belonging to the minority group and the individuals belonging to the majority group

becomes increasingly fluid. In fact, the most extreme form of being acculturated into another social group is that there is no longer any discernable basis for classifying a person as belonging to this social group instead of his/her original social group.[2]

Returning to the classic ingroup/outgroup dichotomy, I conclude that the degree of belonging to the ingroup or not (cf. P1) likely varies with acculturation. Accordingly, I find that the more acculturated into the ingroup an outgroup member is, the more he/she will be treated as an ingroup member rather than as an outgroup member. Hence, my second proposition (P2), which reflects the idea that acculturation makes the initial ingroup/outgroup boundary more diffuse and diminishes the effect of outgroup membership on managerial treatment:

Proposition 2. The difference in managerial treatment between ingroup and outgroup members is smaller for outgroup members that are more acculturated into their employer's ingroup.

As before, I complete this subsection by translating the formulated proposition into a testable hypothesis using acculturation as the explanatory variable while retaining variation in job autonomy as the phenomenon to be explained. I thereby focus on the temporal dimension of acculturation—a process of reaching a certain degree of similarity with the ingroup that unfolds over time (cf. Redfield et al., 1935). The reason is that the temporal dimension of acculturation

[2] Whether achieving such a level of acculturation is feasible is, of course, another story. Personal values, beliefs, norms, rituals, language, et cetera might all be adapted to the other group to a relatively large degree. Changing, for instance, one's skin color would be much more difficult, however.

matches earlier empirical work considering the effect of experience or time spent in the host country on migrant (labor market) outcomes (see Chiswick, 1978 for an early study). Emphasizing this temporal dimension of acculturation, I find that the native-migrant, ingroup-outgroup distinction loses salience with the amount of time that a migrant employee has spent in the host country. Hence, I expect that migrants that have been living in the host country longer are treated more similar to native employees than migrants lacking this experience are and therefore have more job autonomy than migrants lacking this experience have. My second hypothesis (H2) thus reads as follows:

Hypothesis 2. Migrant employees that have been living in their host countries longer have more job autonomy.

Group-Level Traits and Differential Managerial Treatment

So far, my analysis has emphasized ingroup/outgroup membership as a key driver of differentials in managerial treatment between social groups, only allowing for employee heterogeneity associated with acculturation into the ingroup. In the remainder of this section, however, I want to dig deeper and work on unpacking differentials between multiple social groups.

Some of the earliest theoretical work on discrimination emphasized the distinction between so-called taste-based and statistical discrimination (Arrow, 1972; Aigner & Cain, 1977). The former type of discrimination is purely affect-based, meaning that, for whatever reason, an individual (or group of individuals) has a strong dislike of individuals deemed to belong to a particular social group (e.g., “hate for men/women”). Statistical discrimination, on the other

hand, has a cognitive basis, as it involves making rational inferences about an individual on the basis of observable (average) traits of the group to which this individual belongs (e.g., "you are a man/woman and therefore you (do not) have great upper body strength").[3]

Importantly, both types of discrimination—taste-based or statistical—fit the classic ingroup/outgroup paradigm (Allport, 1954; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). However, a distinction is that statistical discrimination affects managerial treatment irrespective of the ingroup/outgroup dichotomy and corresponding ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation. Indeed, an employee does not need to belong to the employer's outgroup to be judged and treated differentially on the basis of some group-level trait: a man and a woman may be managed differentially even when both belong to the employer's ingroup. Moreover, statistical discrimination theories emphasize observable group traits as the basis for employee-level inferences and subsequent differential treatment and do not refer to negative stereotypes that do not have such an objective basis. On the other hand, some form of statistical discrimination is, of course, also often used either to classify individuals into different social categories—all individuals with great upper body strength and, therefore, all men are in the outgroup—or to make a more fine-grained distinction between the diverse set of outgroup members.

My motivation for integrating statistical discrimination theories in my proposed framework actually derives from the latter application of statistical discrimination by employers. Drawing on statistical discrimination theories, I can dig beyond ingroup/outgroup differences in managerial treatment and unpack the factors biasing employers and leading to treatment

[3] To be sure, while an inference based on a group trait is typically rational, this rationality in and of itself does not mean that acting on the inference leads to an optimal decision.

differentials between a larger number of distinct social groups (> 2). Overall, I propose the following (P3):

Proposition 3. Traits of a distinctive social group to which an employee belongs affect how the employee is managed.

If anything, P3 provides the foundation for a large number of hypotheses. Notably, there are numerous group traits that employers might draw on to make inferences about an individual employee that, in turn, shape their decision on how much autonomy to grant to this employee. In addition, there are many different criteria that one can apply when classifying the diverse set of outgroup members into a larger number of distinct social groups (age, social class, sexual orientation, religion, et cetera).

To start with the latter issue, I find that both the large literature on national stereotypes (Katz & Braly, 1933; Madon et al., 2001) as well as worldwide trends in the home-country composition of migrant populations (Castles, de Haas, & Miller, 2014; OECD, 2015) suggest that individuals' home country provides an illuminating basis for subdividing the migrant outgroup in multiple distinct social groups (see also, for example, Lee & Fiske, 2006). Concerning the former issue, in contrast, even limiting attention to the set of home-country traits that prior research has identified as affecting migrant outcomes is bound to result in many more group-level explanatory variables than can be consired in one paper. However, among the home-country traits found to affect migrant outcomes, the importance of home-country level of economic development seems to stand out (see Borjas, 1987 for an early study). Hence, I adopt home-country economic development as the explanatory variable in the empirical counterpart to

P3. Concretely, I thereby expect that, in the mind of employers deciding on how much autonomy to grant to an employee from a particular home country, a higher level of economic development is seen as a positive. The logic is that home-country economic development signals some positive qualities that an employer may wish to harness by offering a certain degree of discretion and right to self-management to the employee. Moreover, economic development is associated with strong social norms towards cooperation (Fukuyama, 1995), meaning that home-country economic development can be taken as a signal of an employee's trustworthiness. My third hypothesis (H3) correspondingly reads:

Hypothesis 3. Migrant employees born in home countries that are more economically developed have more job autonomy.

Social Distance

While acculturation is expected to have a significant effect on the nature and extent of the ingroup/outgroup dichotomy, the idea of varying degrees of belonging and not belonging to a particular social group fits a larger literature on the social distance that can exist between two individuals (or two groups of individuals) (Bogardus, 1925; Karakayali, 2009). An early, formal definition of social distance is as "the grades and degrees of understanding and intimacy which characterize personal and social relations generally" (Park, 1924, p. 339). Practically, the concept of social distance concerns interpersonal (dis)similarities in such domains as personal values, beliefs, dialect, religiosity and/or social class (Karakayali, 2009). These (dis)similarities, in turn, can be salient characteristics for social categorization and the classifying of another individual as

belonging to one's ingroup or not. Moreover, the smaller the social distance between two groups, the more favorable attitude they have towards one another (Akerlof, 1997; Brewer, 1999; Karakayali, 2009). Accordingly, I conclude that social distance affects managerial treatment in much the same way as group membership in general, and belonging to the ingroup in particular, does (see above). Specifically, I have the following proposition (P4) on social distance between the employee's social group and the employer's ingroup and managerial treatment:

Proposition 4. The average social distance between a particular social group and their employer's ingroup affects how employees belonging to this social group are managed.

In translating P4 into a testable hypothesis, a challenge is again that, as mentioned, the number of ways in which a particular social group can be socially close or distant to another group is enormous (Karakayali, 2009). Also in this case, however, I can draw on extant work to identify some relevant forms of social distance to consider in my empirical analysis.

Following the previous subsection, I take the subdivision of the migrant outgroup into distinct social groups on the basis of a migrant's home country as a starting point. As it turns out, I also need to distinguish between different ingroups faced by the migrant employees in my sample, lest my analysis ends up conflating effects due to intergroup distance with effects due to underlying group traits (Van Hoorn & Maseland, 2014, 2015). As I already consider home countries in my analysis, I find that the most appropriate criterion for subdividing the native ingroup in my analysis into multiple social groups is on the basis of country of residence, i.e., on the basis of host country. Concretely, my empirical analysis thus considers social distance as it exists between the dyad formed by a migrant's home country and his/her host country.

Home-host country dyads are widely studied, particularly in international management, which emphasizes the effect of home-host country distance or (dis)similarities on the behavior and performance of multinational enterprises (see Eden & Miller, 2004 for a survey). From an initial focus on so-called psychic and cultural distance (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977; Kogut & Singh, 1988), the distance literature in international management has gradually broadened the scope of dyadic distance measures studied to include a variety of dimensions on which two countries can be more or less similar to one another (e.g., Ghemawat, 2001; Dow & Karunaratna, 2006). The theoretical rationale for the proposed effects of distance on multinational enterprises typically involve such mechanisms as intercountry dissimilarities hampering the flow of information, providing a basis for discrimination against nondomestic firms, and leading to a general lack of social ties in the host country (e.g., Zaheer, 1995).

For the case of managerial treatment of migrant groups, I expect that similar mechanisms are at play. However, I do not expect that all forms of home-host distance considered in the international management literature are equally relevant determinants of managerial treatment. From the many dimensions of intercountry distance suggested by Ghemawat (2001) and Dow and Karunaratna (2006), I thus select two of the most relevant forms of distance to consider in my empirical analysis. These two forms of home-host country distance are language, specifically shared official language between the migrant's home country and his/her host country, and the existence of past colonial ties between the migrant's home country and his/her host country. The reason that I deem these particular forms of dyadic distance relevant is that I think that they affect how individuals belonging to one group feel about individuals belonging to the other group and vice versa. Shared language facilitates communication and allows people to understand each other better than when communication is more difficult. Similarly, the existence

of past colonial ties signals that individuals from the two countries are aware of each other and have familiarized themselves with each other and the other country for a longer time already. Hence, I expect that both shared language and past colonial ties reflect smaller social distance between two countries. Smaller social distance, in turn, likely leads employers to grant more job autonomy to the particular employee, as per some of the arguments concerning trust and ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation introduced earlier. At the same time, though, I think there can be a second channel through which common language and past colonial ties end up having a positive effect on job autonomy. For this channel, which does not necessarily involve decreased social distance, the argument is that shared language and colonial ties correlate positively with migrants' job autonomy because migrants sharing these features with their host countries are less hampered by barriers to the flow of valuable information and better acquainted with the host-country social, economic and institutional environment. This knowledge advantage, in turn, would make them more effective and reliable employees compared to migrants speaking another language and lacking past ties with their host country. Overall, I have the following set of twin hypotheses:

Hypothesis 4a. Migrant employees have more job autonomy if they are born in home countries that have the same official language as the host country has.

Hypothesis 4b. Migrant employees have more job autonomy if they are born in home countries that have past colonial ties with the host country.

MATERIALS AND METHOD

Sample and Data Sources

My main data source is the bi-annual European Social Survey or ESS (Jowell & Central Co-ordinating Team, 2007).[4] The ESS has collected answers on a variety of questionnaire items for nationally representative samples from 32, mostly European countries. Following the approach used in various other studies (e.g., Alesina & Giuliano, 2011; Luttmer & Singhal, 2011), I use the questionnaire item that asks respondents whether they are born in their country of residence to distinguish between natives and migrants in the ESS data. Similarly, if the answer to this question is no, I use the follow-up question that asks in which country the respondent is born to obtain information on migrants' home country. In six waves (2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010 & 2012), the ESS has collected data for more than 250,000 individuals, both migrants and natives. Excluding respondents with missing data on some of my (control) variables (see below) leaves a main sample of 151,834 individuals, 13,628 out of which are migrants. When considering differences in job autonomy between migrants from different home countries the sample is reduced to about 12,500 migrant employees. The 32 countries originally covered by the ESS are the host countries in my analysis and all estimations include controls for host-country fixed effects.[5] The migrants in my sample cover more than 160 home countries and form more than

[4] For a complete description of the ESS and the questionnaire items included in this survey, see http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org.

[5] These host countries are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Switzerland, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Greece, Croatia, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Iceland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia, Turkey, and Ukraine. Inclusion of host-country

1,250 unique home-host country dyads, depending on the specific variables considered. Importantly, my sample meets all the criteria for an analysis that is able to separate effects that are specific to a home-host dyad, i.e., home-host (dis)similarities, from effects that are specific to the home and/or host countr(y)(ies) involved (Van Hoorn & Maseland, 2014, 2015). To save space, I do no present the full list of home countries in my analysis. For the same reason, I present only some descriptive statistics (Tables A.1 and A.2 in the appendix) and no correlations between the variables in my analysis. Note, though, that I have checked and that multicollinearity is never a concern. Further details on my sample and complete descriptive statistics are available on request.

To test my first and second hypothesis, I rely strictly on ESS data. To test my other hypotheses, however, I supplement the ESS data with data for home-country variables and dyadic variables from a variety of sources. Data on countries' level of economic development come from the World Bank World Development Indicators database (World Bank, 2015), while data on country dyads, specifically shared language and home-host country colonial ties come from the well-known CEPII distance database (Mayer & Zignago, 2011). All data used in this paper are publicly available.

Although a large portion of my data are survey data that come from the same source, I do not expect common method bias to pose any problems. The reason is that, with the exception of my dependent variable, almost all of the items from the ESS that I use refer to objective phenomena that are recorded by the interviewer and do not ask respondents to make their own, subjective

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fixed effects allows me to control for country-level factors such as cultural norms that affect how migrants are treated in a particular country (cf. Gelfand, Nishii, Raver, & Schneider, 2005).

assessment. To err on the safe side, I also did a formal check using Harman's single factor test, but, as expected, this test did not identify a general factor driving variation in my variables.

Variables

Dependent Variable. The dependent variable in my analysis is job autonomy, specifically the amount of autonomy that an employer grants to an employee, as experienced by the employee. Job autonomy is measured using a questionnaire item that asks respondents "how much the management at your work allows/allowed you to decide how your own daily work is/was organised?," where answers can be given on Likert-type scale that ranges from 0, "I have/had no influence" to 10, "I have/had complete control." This item is a variation on the classic item concerning job autonomy pioneered by Hackman and Oldham (1975) and widely used since. Applications of the ESS data in general and the job autonomy item and data in particular run similarly widely, increasingly also in management (Gooderham, Nordhaug, & Ringdal, 2006; Muethel, Hoegl, & Parboteeah, 2011; Van Hoorn, 2015b). Although there is much work showing that job autonomy indicators such as the one that I use are valid, original evidence on the construct validity of the ESS item is available on request. Because the ESS introduced a slight change in wording of the job autonomy item between the first wave in 2002 and later waves—from referring only to the present tense ("allows" and "is") to referring to the past tense ("allowed" and "was") as well—I add dummies for the year/wave of the survey in all analyses, this way getting rid of any year/wave-specific measurement error. To ease interpretation of the results and following the standard set by past work, I analyze the job autonomy indicator as a cardinal variable. However, as one of my robustness checks, I also assess whether my results are sensitive to this assumption.

A possible drawback of using the job autonomy indicator as the dependent variable is that this indicator is based on a single item, making it prone to measurement error. Such measurement error, in turn, will not bias my estimates but could make them less precise. To deal with this issue, I have also constructed a two-item index of so-called job influence that combines the above job autonomy item with a survey item asking respondents how much the management at their work allows/allowed them to influence policy decisions about the activities of the organization. Consistent with other work (Van Hoorn, 2015b), I find that combining this item on decision influence with the original job autonomy item renders a reliable index of job influence (Cronbach alpha = .793). I use the two-item index of job influence to check the robustness of the results that I obtain using the single-item job autonomy indicator as the dependent variable.

Main Independent Variables. My first main independent variable is the dummy variable that I use to distinguish between natives (0) and migrants (1). I use this variable to test H1 concerning the differential managerial treatment of migrant employees vis-à-vis native employees. Later on, when focusing on differences in managerial treatment between various groups of migrants, I use this variable to limit my sample to consider migrants only.

For my second hypothesis, I assess the role of acculturation, which I consider by looking at time spent in the host country. In Waves 1-4, the ESS included a survey item asking respondents "how long ago did you first come to live in [country]?," pre-specifying some possible answers, for example, "6-10 years ago" or "More than 20 years ago." In Waves 5-6, the relevant survey item was rephrased to ask: "What year did you first come to live in [country]?" To make the answers to these two survey items compatible, I create three dummy variables corresponding to three "types" of migrants: (i) migrants that have spent between 0 and 5 years in the host country;

(ii) migrants that have spent between 6 and 10 years in the host country; and (iii) migrants that have spent more than 10 years in the host country. My acculturation hypothesis (H2) predicts that these three types of migrants have different levels of job autonomy.

For H3 concerning the effect of migrants' home country, specifically the home country's level of economic development, on the amount of job autonomy that a migrant employee has, I consider these countries' average level of income per capita. I calculate country means of the per-capita gross domestic product (GDP) measured in US dollars and with purchasing power parity for the years 2004-2013, as available from the World Bank World Development Indicators database (World Bank, 2015).

Finally, for H4a and H4b concerning dyad-specific effects on the amount of job autonomy that certain groups of migrant employees have, I consider two dummy variables. The first dummy variable concerns shared language and has a score of 1 if the migrants' home country and the host country share the same official language and a score of 0 otherwise. The second dummy variable concerns colonial ties between the migrant's home country and the host country and has a score of 1 if there have been colonial ties between the home and the host country and a score of 0 otherwise (Mayer & Zignago, 2011).

Control Variables. In addition, to my main independent variables, I consider a variety of (individual-level) control variables. In general, there is a concern for an omitted variable bias in my analysis. The migrant dummy—but variables concerning a migrant's home country or a specific home-host dyad as well—may correlate with or proxy for some unobserved variable that has a direct effect on the amount of job autonomy that an employer grants to an employee, regardless of whether the employee is a migrant or not or regardless of specific features of a

migrant's home country or the specific home-host dyad to which the migrant employee belongs.

As stated, in all my empirical, models I control for both year and host-country fixed effects. Other factors that I control for are standard demographic characteristics (age, age squared, and gender), employment status (e.g., in paid work, unemployed & looking for job, unemployed & not looking for job, in education, retired), and total hours worked, which proxies both for the type of job one has and an employee's willingness to perform paid work. Meanwhile, some of the most likely confounders have to do with level of education and I control for differences in education using two variables simultaneously. First, I control for the number of years of full-time education that a respondent has completed. Second, I control for respondents' level of education. The ESS records the highest level of education that a respondent has using the European Survey version of the ISCED (International Standard Classification of Education) and I recode this categorical variable in a group of seven dummies and one reference category. Some of the categories discerned are "less than lower secondary" and "lower secondary" all the way up to "lower tertiary education, BA level" and "higher tertiary education."

To rule out that migrants are, for some (non-discriminatory) reason, self-selected into jobs characterized by distinctive amounts of autonomy, I further control for the nature of the employment relation (employee, self-employed, or working for own family business) and specific features of the industry in which a respondent works. For the latter, I construct two industry-level control variables based on averages calculated across all the respondents working in a certain industry. The first industry average that I consider is the mean amount of job autonomy in the industry, which provides a direct way of controlling for the influence that an employee's industry has on his/her job autonomy. The second industry average that I consider is the percentage of total employees in an industry that is non-native. By including this variable I

can control for possible effects of access to migrant networks that may be more present in some industries than in others (cf. Ibarra, 1995; Seibert, Kraimer, & Liden, 2001) as well as for industry-specific features of organizations' external environment that might affect the managerial treatment of migrant employees (cf. Gelfand, Nishii, Raver, & Schneider, 2005).

Notwithstanding this extensive set of control variables, there might still be some factor, not yet considered by me, that leads employers to grant less autonomy to migrants in general or to specific migrant groups. Notably, in line with theories of statistical discrimination (Arrow, 1972; Aigner & Cain, 1977), it is possible that migrant status proxies for a lack of certain unobserved traits or skills that would be taken into account by any employer deciding on how much autonomy to grant to a specific employee, regardless of group membership or social distance and the like. The fact that I take into account such relevant factors as education and number of hours worked makes this scenario relatively unlikely. Nevertheless, I cannot rule out this possibility in my analysis in principle. Hence, as powerful test of the robustness of my baseline results obtained using the set of standard control variable described above, I repeat my baseline analyses but add a control for personal income. The rationale is that the income of an employee is a good proxy for the value that an employer attaches to the work done by this employee, as when more productive employees, on average, earn more than less productive employees do. The ESS asks respondents about their household's total net income and classifies the answer on either a 12-point scale (Waves 1-3) or a 10-point scale (Waves 4-6). To increase the intertemporal and cross-country comparability of measured income, I follow Van Hoorn (2015a) and construct a measure of rank income, specifically the percentile score of a respondents' recorded income relative to the recorded income of other respondents from the same country and surveyed in the same year.

A final control variable that I consider as a robustness check is meant to deal with possible

response biases. The concern is that some respondents, particularly respondents from certain cultural backgrounds, are overly positive or overly negative when asked to provide a subjective assessment of their experiences. The implication is that some respondents may understate or overstate their job autonomy, which could lead to biased estimates. I control for such positive/negative response style in a most straightforward fashion, which is to include a measure of self-reported happiness. Of all possible subjective assessments, self-reported happiness seems most sensitive to positive/negative response style, meaning that adding self-reported happiness allows me to control for respondents' tendency to be overly positive or negative when assessing their lives in a most direct manner. The specific measure that I use derives from the survey item asking respondents "taking all things together, how happy would you say you are?," where possible answers can range from 0, "extremely unhappy" to 10, "extremely happy."

To conclude, let me state explicitly that quite a few of my control variables are bound to be affected by some of the same processes that affect how migrant employees and employees belonging to different migrant groups are managed, not least the income that an employee earns.[6] Hence, one can argue that controlling for all the above-mentioned factors actually means throwing away the baby with the bathwater. Nevertheless, I consider these variables to limit potential biases due to omitted variables, even though this means that some of my estimated coefficients are probably best seen as lower bounds.

[6] Indeed, in addition to the initial hiring decision, wage differentials among different social groups are probably the most studied outcome variable in the large cross-disciplinary literature on labor market discrimination and workforce diversity (see Pager & Shepherd, 2008 and Lang & Lehmann, 2012 for surveys).

Method

Testing my hypotheses requires estimating different models. For H1, I use the complete sample (n=151,834) and estimate a model that allows me to compare the average amount of job autonomy that migrant employees have with the average amount of job autonomy that native employees have. This model reads as follows:

$$A_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 M_i + \beta_2 X_i + \varepsilon_i , \quad (1)$$

where A_i denotes the amount of job autonomy that employee i has, M_i is a dummy variable indicating whether an individual is a migrant (1) or not (0), X_i is a set of control variables (host-country fixed effects, year/wave fixed effects, age, gender, et cetera) and ε_i is a random error term. The relevant coefficient is β_1 and H1 is confirmed if this coefficient is statistically significantly negative.

For my other hypotheses, I consider a sample comprising only migrants, where the exact size of the sample varies with the specific explanatory variables considered. The complete model that I use but modify to suit specific tests is as follows:

$$A_{idm} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T_{idm} + \beta_2 E_{im} + \beta_3 D_{id} + \beta_4 X_i + \varepsilon_{idm} , \quad (2)$$

where A_{idm} denotes the amount of job autonomy of employee i who is nested in home-host dyad d and has home country m, X_i denotes a set of control variables (host-country fixed effects, year/wave fixed effects, age, gender, et cetera) and ε_{idm} is a random term. T_{idm} further denotes the

time that migrant i has spent in the host country, while E_{im} denotes the level of economic development of the home country of migrant i. Similarly, D_{id} refers to properties of the home-host country dyad in which migrant i is nested, specifically shared official language and colonial ties. Confirmation of H2 requires that coefficient β_1 is statistically significantly positive, while confirmation of H3 requires that coefficient β_2 is statistically significantly positive. Similarly, confirmation of either H4a or H4b requires that coefficient β_3 is statistically significantly positive.

To estimate the above models, I use OLS. However, when it comes to testing the effects of migrants' home country or effects specific to a home-host country dyad, my data take on a hierarchical structure with individual observations nested in higher-order units of analysis, either home countries or home-host country dyads. Since such hierarchical clustering of observations can introduce biases, I use cluster-corrected standard errors when estimating the model depicted in Eq. 2. Moreover, in case multiway clustering occurs and I need to choose between possible levels at which to cluster my standard errors, specifically home countries versus home-host country dyads, I always select the home-country level, as this is the highest level in the analysis (Cameron, Gelbach, & Miller, 2011). Similarly, when assessing the sensitivity of my results to the assumed cardinality of the job autonomy indicator, I use left- and right-censored tobit estimation and, particularly, ordered probit estimation instead of OLS. I estimate all coefficients using robust standard errors.

EMPIRICAL RESULTS

Baseline Results

I start my empirical analysis providing basic tests for my hypotheses. Models 1-3 in Table 2

present results for my first hypothesis (H1) that migrant employees have less job autonomy than native employees have. Results confirm this hypothesis, as they indicate a strong negative effect of being a migrant vis-à-vis a native on job autonomy (Model 1). Adding control variables such as years of education changes the estimated coefficient for being a migrant a bit but not much (Models 2 and 3). The migrant-native gap is sizeable, equal to about half a point on the 0-10 job autonomy scale. Moreover, the gap is more than two and a halve times larger than the gender gap. Similarly, to compensate for being born in another country, migrant employees would need more than one standard deviation of additional years of education to achieve the same amount of job autonomy that an otherwise comparable native employee has, which is equal to roughly four years of fulltime education.

<< Insert Table 2 about here >>

Considering the role of acculturation (H2), results suggest that the job autonomy of a migrant employee increases with time spent in the host country, confirming my second hypothesis (Table 2, Models 4-6). The biggest difference in job autonomy occurs between migrants that have spent more than 10 years in the host country versus migrants that have spent 10 years or less in the host country. The difference in job autonomy between migrants that have spent between 0 and 5 years and between 6 and 10 years in the host country (the reference category), in contrast, is smaller and not typically statistically significant at usual levels ($p > .1$). The positive effect of acculturation on job autonomy is comparable in size to the effect of a one standard deviation increase in total years of education. Meanwhile, compared to the overall native-migrant autonomy gap (Model 3 in Table 2), the job autonomy difference between the three types of

migrants is also sizeable. However, migrants that have spent 10 years or less in the host country still have less job autonomy than the average native employee has, ceteris paribus (see Table A.3 in the appendix for detailed results on the native-migrant autonomy gap for selected samples of migrants).

<< Insert Table 3 about here >>

H3 predicts that migrants from different home countries have different levels of job autonomy on the count of the level of economic development of their home countries. Results (Model 7 in Table 3) confirm this prediction. Home-country level of economic development appears to play a role in how much job autonomy a migrant employee has and the size of this effect is comparable to, though somewhat smaller than, the effect of years of education. Interestingly, it is possible that there is no autonomy gap between migrants from economically very advanced countries and the average native employee. That is, the autonomy gap that exists between the average migrant employee and the average native employee (Model 3 in Table 2) could vanish if we consider only non-average migrants born in a very limited set of high-income home countries (again see Table A.3 in the appendix for detailed results on the native-migrant autonomy gap for selected samples of migrants).

My final, twin set of hypotheses (H4a & H4b) concerns effects on migrants' job autonomy that derive from the specific dyad formed by the migrant's home and host country. Results suggest that there are indeed effects on the amount of job autonomy that a migrant employee has that are due to features of the home-host dyad to which a migrant belongs (Models 8-10 in Table 3). Both shared language and past colonial ties between the home and the host country of the

migrant are associated with higher levels of job autonomy for the employee. However, the effect of colonial ties becomes small and statistically insignificant at usual levels ($p > .1$) when shared language is taken into account (Model 10). At almost 0.13, the positive effect of shared language remains about equally large, however. Meanwhile, as with acculturation, migrants that speak the language of their host country still have less job autonomy than the average native employee has (Table A.3 in the appendix again presents detailed results on the native-migrant autonomy gap for selected samples of migrants).

Robustness Checks

Omitted variable bias. A main objection against the above results is that they suffer an omitted variable bias. Particularly, as discussed in the previous section, the migrant-native dichotomy, as well as traits of migrants' home country and home-host country dyadic distance, could proxy for an unobserved variable, notably employee quality, that is a valid and useful criterion for employers to use to inform the decision of how much job autonomy to grant to an employee (cf. Arrow, 1972; Aigner & Cain, 1977). My extensive use of control variables such as education level, years of education and hours worked goes a long way to address this bias. However, as an even stricter test of my hypotheses, I repeat the above analyses controlling for employees' income. Income differs from objective variables such as education in that it captures the value of the employee to an employer, meaning that the income earned by an employee is a good proxy for the presence or absence of specific qualities of the employee that are of value to the employer. Hence, if an omitted variable concerning employee quality is biasing my results, this variable should correlate strongly with income, so that controlling for income effectively eliminates the possibility of an omitted variable bias.

<< Insert Table 4 about here >>

Table 4 presents the results. In all cases, income, specifically income rank, correlates strongly positively with job autonomy, which is consistent with the above argument for income as a suitable proxy for unobserved employee qualities. More importantly, all my results are robust to controlling for income (cf. Tables 2 and 3). The only noticeable difference is that, compared to my baseline analysis, coefficients for the key independent variables are slightly smaller than before. Meanwhile, a model that includes all key independent variables simultaneously (while also controlling for income) renders results similar to results obtained when testing each hypothesis separately (Tables 2 and 3 and Models 11-14 in Table 4), but with lower coefficients (Model 15 in Table 4).

Alternative dependent variable. As a second robustness check, I consider whether my results are sensitive to the specific indicator that I use to operationalize how an employee is managed. As elaborated in the previous section, as an alternative to the single-item job autonomy indicator, I use a two-item index measuring the amount of influence that an employee has in his/her job. Results (Table 5) are highly similar to my baseline results. Effect sizes, as captured by standardized coefficients, can be slightly smaller when considering job influence than when job considering autonomy. Still, though, results are robust and do not appear to be driven by the specific indicator that I use to measure how an employee is managed.

<< Insert Table 5 about here >>

Controlling for possible biases due to positive/negative response style. As a third robustness check, I consider the possibility that systematic (culture-based) differences in response style, particularly overly positive or negative self-assessments, bias my results. To do so, I control for respondents' self-reported happiness, which is a subjective assessment that respondents make of their lives as a whole and is therefore most prone to positive/negative response style influences. Results (Table 6) are highly similar to my baseline results, indicating that positive/negative response style is unlikely to play a large role in my analysis.

<< Insert Table 6 about here >>

Alternatives to OLS estimation. As a final robustness check, I repeat my baseline analyses but using estimation methods that explicitly deal with the fact that the job autonomy indicator is, strictly speaking, not a cardinal variable even though it is treated as such by my use of OLS estimation. As we would expect, results (Table 7) using these different estimation methods are highly comparable to and confirm my baseline results. Hence, my initial estimates do not seem biased on the count of using OLS.

<< Insert Table 7 about here >>

Discussion

Are migrant employees managed differently than native employees with similar characteristics and qualifications are and, if so, on what basis? Concerning the first question, I find strong evidence indicating that migrant employees are managed differently than native employees are. Drawing on social identity theory, I expected that being foreign-born versus native-born is an important criterion for social categorization and subsequent differential managerial treatment and this prediction is borne out by the data. Importantly, the observed migrant-native job autonomy gap is robust to controlling for a range of other variables that might distinguish the average migrant employee from the average native employee, particularly differences in education level. In fact, a sizeable difference in the managerial treatment of migrants and natives remains when taking into account native-migrant income differentials, the most prominent concern in the cross-disciplinary literature on labor market discrimination and workforce diversity (Pager & Shepherd, 2008; Lang & Lehmann, 2012). Hence, the evidence overwhelmingly supports my first hypothesis that migrant employees have less job autonomy than comparable native employees do.

Digging deeper in the migrant-native gap in managerial treatment, specifically the amount of job autonomy that an employee has, results indicate an important effect of acculturation. The more time a migrant has spent in his/her host country, the more job autonomy he/she has. Moreover, this effect is again robust to controlling for various factors, including the income that an employee earns.

Concerning the second question, I have sought to unpack differentials in managerial treatment between specific groups of migrants, where I defined group membership using country of birth or home country as the classification criterion. Drawing on theories of statistical discrimination, I

expected that features of migrants' home countries, specifically level of economic development, would provide a basis for differential managerial treatment. Results confirm this expectation, indicating a robust relationship between the level of economic development of a migrants' home country and the amount of job autonomy that a migrant has in his/her host country. Similarly, I used social distance theory to hypothesize that features of the dyad formed by a migrant's home country and his/her host country, specifically shared language and past colonial ties, affect how the migrant is managed. Results largely confirm this hypothesis, except for the effect of home-host country colonial ties on migrant employees' job autonomy, which is not typically statistically significant at usual levels ($p > .1$).

Overall, my empirical analysis has revealed significant and robust differences in the amount of autonomy that different groups in society have at their jobs, particularly migrants vis-à-vis natives. Moreover, differences found are consistent with the various mechanisms identified in my theoretical framework of differential managerial treatment of social groups, including acculturation and statistical discrimination. Hence, the main finding of my empirical analysis is not only that my hypotheses receive widespread support but also that my theoretical framework indeed provides a valid description of how employers are led to differentiate between various social groups when deciding on how to manage their employees. The integration of various theoretical perspectives results in a comprehensive framework that offers much relevant insight for understanding employers' biases and the suboptimal use of human capital resources and societal inequality that result from these biases.

The general robustness as well as the managerial and societal relevance of this paper's findings notwithstanding, there are also some limitations to the analysis presented in this paper. Some of the most prominent limitations are as follows. First, both my theorizing and subsequent

empirical analyses only consider mechanisms and factors that affect employers when deciding how much autonomy to grant to a specific employee and do not incorporate employee agency. While the power to grant autonomy ultimately resides with the employer and not the employee, there are actions that an employee can take in an attempt to secure a higher amount of job autonomy (should he/she desire so). Nevertheless, I do not think that my comparative neglect of employee agency has biased my results. Moreover, I want to keep my framework as simple as possible, seeking only to address the basic issue of an individual being managed differently than an otherwise comparable individual purely on the basis of group membership. I do think, however, that an interesting avenue for future research is to extend the theoretical framework developed in this paper to allow for employee agency.

Second, my empirical analysis has operationalized differential managerial treatment in strictly quantitative terms, receiving more or less of something. In reality, however, differential treatment is probably not limited to quantitative differences and would find expression in qualitative differences as well. More generally, my analysis has focused on one specific managerial practice and should not be seen as providing exhaustive empirical evidence on all the diverse ways in which migrant and native employees can be managed differentially. Indeed, I welcome follow-up work that considers other forms of differential managerial treatment to complement the empirical evidence that I have presented here. Note, though, that the factors and mechanisms highlighted by my theoretical framework operate independently from the exact way in which differential managerial treatment finds real-life expression in individual employees' workplace experience.

Third, my evidence on the validity of the theoretical framework involves only migrants and natives and not social groups distinguished on the basis of characteristics other than an

employee's country of birth. Indeed, a broader assessment of the validity of my theoretical framework would include a variety of social groups distinguished by such characteristics as age or academic pedigree and even subnational region or religiosity. Meanwhile, my empirical analysis of migrants and natives of course resonates with the large literature on the (labor market) discrimination of migrants (Pager & Shepherd, 2008; Lang & Lehmann, 2012) as well as massive changes in the size and home-country composition of the migrant proportion of workforces worldwide (Castles, de Haas, & Miller, 2014; OECD, 2015).

Fourth, both my theorizing and subsequent empirical analyses have been internally focused and abstained from considering environmental influences that might affect how different groups are managed (Gelfand et al., 2005), except through control variables (e.g., host-country fixed effects). I would expect, however, that the influence of some of the factors and mechanisms that I have considered are conditioned by features of organizations' external environment: the effect of a group trait like home-country economic development may be more critical to managerial treatment in some types of jobs than in others, for instance. Again, I do not think that my comparative neglect of the external environment has biased my results, as these results concern averages for the entire sample of jobs. Incorporating, for instance, features of task interdependency (Lee et al., 2015) would provide an interesting extension to my generic theoretical framework, however.

Finally, my analysis does not yet consider the nexus between group-level traits, acculturation and social distance, particularly between the latter two. In my theoretical framework, I consider these concepts separately but they are highly interrelated. Group-level traits can form a basis for perceived social distance or interpersonal (dis)similarities, while acculturation can be seen as a waning of initial dissimilarities. Indeed, an interesting extension to the present analysis is to

consider how acculturation, specifically time spent in the host country, moderates the effect of, for instance, linguistic distance on managerial treatment. Given the scope of this paper, for now, however, I limit my analysis to considering the direct effects of acculturation and social distance respectively.

CONCLUSION

This paper has presented a study of differentials in the way individual employees are managed based on the social group to which they belong. The issue of differential treatment on the basis of group membership, i.e., discrimination, has a long tradition in management research as well as in the social sciences at large. However, this literature is mostly concerned with discriminatory hiring and reward practices and not with differentials in the way members of various social groups are managed or supervised. Similarly, while many studies have considered group dichotomies based on gender or race, only scant attention has been paid to workforce diversity in the form of foreign-born employees from highly varied national-cultural backgrounds, which has been rapidly increasing in many countries worldwide.

This paper advances the literature in several ways. The paper's most basic contribution is the development of a comprehensive theoretical framework of the differential managerial treatment of social groups that integrates a variety of theories, including social identity and acculturation theory. Application of this framework to the situation faced by migrants from more than 160 different birth countries subsequently rendered unique cross-national empirical evidence on how different groups in society are managed and the basis on which employers are biased to manage some employees differently than other employees. The practical relevance of the framework and these findings is twofold. First, my analysis helps decision makers get a better grasp of the

factors and mechanisms that bias them towards certain social groups in a way that leads to suboptimal use of human capital resources. Second, my paper generates new insight on a much-neglected component of social inequality, which resides in the dissimilar work experiences and managerial practices that people from different social groups are subject to. Meanwhile, the relevance of the analysis presented in this paper could be broadened by shifting attention away from individuals to entire organizations. I have focused my theoretical framework and empirical evidence on individual outcomes. However, my analysis would also apply to entire organizations. In fact, positive and negative biases that are due to organizations' home country and/or home-host country (dis)similarities play a prominent role in international management, meaning that my analysis seems to be highly relevant to researchers and practitioners in this field as well.

APPENDIX

<< Insert Table A.1 about here >>

<< Insert Table A.2 about here >>

<< Insert Table A.3 about here >>

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Table 1: Summary of Predicted Relationships

Proposition	Basis for differential managerial treatment	Hypothesis	Variable in empirical analysis	Effect on job autonomy
1	Belonging to employer's ingroup or to another social group	1	Employee is a migrant or not	-
2	Differences in degree of acculturation into employer's ingroup	2	Acculturation as measured by a migrant employee's time spent in the host country	+
3	Traits of the social group to which the employee belongs	3	Level of economic development of a migrant employee's home country	+
4	Social distance between the employer's ingroup and the outgroup to which the employee belongs	4a	The migrant employee's home country has the same official language as the host country or not	+
		4b	The migrant employee's home country has past colonial ties with the host country or not	+

Table 2: Job Autonomy of Migrant Employees vis-à-vis Native Employees and the Role of Acculturation

Dependent = Job autonomy				Only migrants		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Migrant (1=yes)	-.146*** (.009)	-.163*** (.009)	-.139*** (.008)	-	-	-
Migrant living in host country for 5 or less years (1=yes)	-	-	-	-.025 (.033)	-.062* (.032)	-.049 (.031)
Migrant living in host country for 6 to 10 years (reference category)	-	-	-	0	0	0
Migrant living in host country for more than 10 years (1=yes)	-	-	-	.112*** (.027)	.137*** (.026)	.116*** (.025)
Gender (1=male)	.054*** (.005)	.068*** (.005)	.054*** (.005)	-.006 (.018)	.023 (.017)	.022 (.016)
Hours worked per week	.087*** (.003)	.080*** (.003)	.048*** (.003)	.104*** (.009)	.089*** (.009)	.073*** (.008)
Years of education	-	.118*** (.003)	.102*** (.003)	-	.137*** (.011)	.113*** (.011)
Average job autonomy in individual's industry	-	-	.111*** (.002)	-	-	.118*** (.008)
Percentage migrant employees in individual's industry	-	-	.006** (.002)	-	-	.032*** (.008)
Dummies for employment relation	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Dummies for education level	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Dummies for employment status	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age and age squared	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Host-country dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year/wave dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
No. of observations	151,834	151,834	151,834	13,454	13,454	13,454
No. of migrants	13,628	13,628	13,628	13,454	13,454	13,454
R^2	.1382	.1834	.2565	.1028	.1651	.2329

Notes: All continuous measures (dependent and independent variables) are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.

Table 3: The Effects of Home-Country Economic Development and Home-Host Country Shared Language and Colonial Ties on Migrants' Job Autonomy

Dependent = Job autonomy	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10
Home-country level of economic development	.095*** (.008)	-	-	-
Shared language between home and host country (1=yes)	-	.139*** (.028)	-	.127*** (.029)
Colonial tie between home and host country (1=yes)	-	-	.095*** (.033)	.025 (.035)
Standard control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
No. of observations	12,833	12,792	12,792	12,792
No. of home countries	168	173	173	173
No. of home-host dyads	1,311	1,316	1,316	1,316
Level of clustering of standard errors	Home country	Dyad	Dyad	Dyad
R^2	.2414	.2376	.2360	.2376

Notes: All continuous measures (dependent and independent variables) are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Standard control variables are gender, hours worked per week, years of education, average job autonomy in individual's industry, percentage migrant employees in individual's industry, dummies for employment relation, dummies for education level, dummies for employment status, age and age squared, host-country dummies, and year/wave dummies (see Table 2). Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust standard errors that are clustered at the level indicated in the table. *, ** and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.

Table 4: Robustness Checks with Income Rank as an Added Control Variable

Dependent = Job autonomy		Migrants only			
	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15
Migrant (1=yes)	-.122*** (.008)	-	-	-	-
Migrant living in host country for 5 or less years (1=yes)	-	-.041 (.030)	-	-	-.051 (.035)
Migrant living in host country for 6 to 10 years (reference category)	-	0	-	-	0
Migrant living in host country for more than 10 years (1=yes)	-	.100*** (.025)	-	-	.076*** (.023)
Home-country level of economic development	-	-	.085*** (.008)	-	.079*** (.008)
Shared language between home and host country (1=yes)	-	-	-	.122*** (.028)	.072** (.028)
Colonial tie between home and host country (1=yes)	-	-	-	.026 (.033)	.038 (.030)
Income rank	.101*** (.003)	.102*** (.009)	.099*** (.009)	.108*** (.010)	.096*** (.009)
Standard control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
No. of observations	151,834	13,454	12,833	12,792	12,559
No. of migrants	13,628	13,454	12,833	12,792	12,559
No. of home countries	193	186	168	173	163
No. of home-host dyads	1,596	1,399	1,311	1,316	1,282
Level of clustering of standard errors	Not applicable	Not applicable	Home country	Dyad	Home country
R^2	.2643	.2410	.2490	.2467	.2517

Notes: All continuous measures (dependent and independent variables) are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Standard control variables are gender, hours worked per week, years of education, average job autonomy in individual's industry, percentage migrant employees in individual's industry, dummies for employment relation, dummies for education level, dummies for employment status, age and age squared, host-country dummies, and year/wave dummies (see Table 2). Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust standard errors that are clustered at the level indicated in the table, if applicable. *, ** and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.

Table 5: Results Using an Alternative Measure of How an Employee is Managed

Dependent = Job influence index		Migrants only			
	Model 16	Model 17	Model 18	Model 19	Model 20
Migrant (1=yes)	-.132** (.008)	-	-	-	-
Migrant living in host country for 5 or less years (1=yes)	-	-.045 (.031)	-	-	-.054 (.034)
Migrant living in host country for 6 to 10 years (reference category)	-	0	-	-	0
Migrant living in host country for more than 10 years (1=yes)	-	.119*** (.025)	-	-	.090*** (.029)
Home-country level of economic development	-	-	.092*** (.009)	-	.087*** (.008)
Shared language between home and host country (1=yes)	-	-	-	.118** (.031)	.064** (.026)
Colonial tie between home and host country (1=yes)	-	-	-	.011 (.035)	.023 (.028)
Standard control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
No. of observations	139,499	12,127	11,825	11,770	11,561
No. of migrants	12,490	12,127	11,825	11,770	11,561
No. of home countries	192	185	167	172	162
No. of home-host dyads	1,553	1,353	1,266	1,270	1,240
Level of clustering of standard errors	Not applicable	Not applicable	Home country	Dyad	Home country
R^2	.3569	.3261	.3320	.3275	.3351

Notes: All continuous measures (dependent and independent variables) are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Standard control variables are gender, hours worked per week, years of education, average job autonomy in individual's industry, percentage migrant employees in individual's industry, dummies for employment relation, dummies for education level, dummies for employment status, age and age squared, host-country dummies, and year/wave dummies (see Table 2). Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust standard errors that are clustered at the level indicated in the table, if applicable. *, ** and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.

Table 6: Results with Negative or Positive Response Style Controlled for

Dependent = Job autonomy		Migrants only			
	Model 21	Model 22	Model 23	Model 24	Model 25
Migrant (1=yes)	-.131*** (.008)	-	-	-	-
Migrant living in host country for 5 or less years (1=yes)	-	-.050* (.031)	-	-	-.063* (.036)
Migrant living in host country for 6 to 10 years (reference category)	-	0	-	-	0
Migrant living in host country for more than 10 years (1=yes)	-	.112*** (.025)	-	-	.086*** (.025)
Home-country level of economic development	-	-	.089*** (.008)	-	.081*** (.009)
Shared language between home and host country (1=yes)	-	-	-	.127*** (.028)	.075*** (.028)
Colonial tie between home and host country (1=yes)	-	-	-	.025 (.034)	.037 (.030)
Self-reported happiness	.100*** (.003)	.093*** (.009)	.088*** (.008)	.094*** (.009)	.087*** (.009)
Standard control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
No. of observations	151,236	13,170	12,768	12,727	12,498
No. of migrants	13,560	13,170	12,768	12,727	12,498
No. of home countries	193	186	168	173	163
No. of home-host dyads	1,596	1,397	1,309	1,314	1,280
Level of clustering of standard errors	Not applicable	Not applicable	Home country	Dyad	Home country
R^2	.2645	.2406	.2483	.2455	.2513

Notes: All continuous measures (dependent and independent variables) are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Standard control variables are gender, hours worked per week, years of education, average job autonomy in individual's industry, percentage migrant employees in individual's industry, dummies for employment relation, dummies for education level, dummies for employment status, age and age squared, host-country dummies, and year/wave dummies (see Table 2). Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust standard errors that are clustered at the level indicated in the table, if applicable. *, ** and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.

Table 7: Robustness Checks with Alternative Estimation Methods

Dependent = Job autonomy (0-10)	Tobit		Ordered probit		OLS estimates for comparison	
	Model 26	Model 27	Model 28	Model 29	Model 30	Model 31
Migrant (1=yes)	-.671*** (.042)	-	-.276*** (.017)	-	-.482*** (.029)	-
Migrant living in host country for 5 or less years (1=yes)	-	-.400** (.179)	-	-.137** (.065)	-	-.217* (.126)
Migrant living in host country for 6 to 10 years (reference category)	-	0	-	0	-	0
Migrant living in host country for more than 10 years (1=yes)	-	.422*** (.135)	-	.177*** (.050)	-	.312*** (.088)
Home-country level of economic development	-	.437*** (.044)	-	.173*** (.050)	-	.316*** (.031)
Shared language between home and host country (1=yes)	-	.375** (.150)	-	.138** (.058)	-	.251** (.102)
Colonial tie between home and host country (1=yes)	-	.139 (.171)	-	.040 (.063)	-	.138 (.111)
Standard control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
No. of observations	151,834	12,559	151,834	12,559	151,834	12,559
No. of natives	138,206	0	138,206	0	138,206	0
No. of migrants	13,628	12,559	13,628	12,559	13,628	12,559
No. of home countries	193	163	193	163	193	163
No. of home-host dyads	1,596	1,282	1,596	1,282	1,596	1,282
Level of clustering of standard errors	Not applicable	Home country	Not applicable	Home country	Not applicable	Home country
Pseudo R^2	.0661	.0622	.0740	.0693	Not applicable	Not applicable
R^2	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable	.2565	.2446

Notes: All continuous independent variables are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Standard control variables are gender, hours worked per week, years of education, average job autonomy in individual's industry, percentage migrant employees in individual's industry, dummies for employment relation, dummies for education level, dummies for employment status, age and age squared, host-country dummies, and year/wave dummies (see Table 2). Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust

standard errors that are clustered at the level indicated in the table, if applicable. *, ** and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. Model 30 is equivalent to Model 3 in Table 2.

Table A.1: Selected Descriptive Statistics for Migrant and Native Employees

Variable	Migrant employees [n=13,628 unless otherwise indicated]	Native employees [n=138,206 unless otherwise indicated]	Complete sample [n=151,834 unless otherwise indicated]
Job autonomy (0-10)	5.84 (3.58)	6.21 (3.45)	6.17 (3.46)
Gender (1=male)	46.6% (49.9%)	48.1% (50.0%)	48.0% (50.0%)
Age in years	46.9 (16.1)	48.0 (16.8)	47.9 (16.8)
Years of full-time education completed	13.1 (4.26)	12.7 (3.90)	12.8 (3.93)
Total hours normally worked per week in main job overtime included	39.7 (13.7)	40.2 (13.4)	40.2 (13.5)
Rank income	46.9 (28.3)	51.0 (28.4)	50.7 (28.4)
Happiness (0-10)	7.22 (2.00) [n=13,560]	7.27 (1.96) [n=137,676]	7.27 (1.96) [n=151,236]
Job influence index	-.079 (1.01) [n=12,490]	.008 (.998) [n=127,009]	0 (1) [n=139,499]

Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses.

Table A.2: Selected Descriptive Statistics for Migrant Employees

Variable	Mean	SD
Migrant living in host country for 5 years or less (1=yes) [n=13,454]	12.4%	33.0%
Migrant living in host country for 6 to 10 years (1=yes) [n=13,454]	12.0%	32.5%
Migrant living in host country for more than 10 years (1=yes) [n=13,454]	75.6%	43.0%
Home-country level of economic development in US$ purchasing power parity [n=12,833]	15,489	16,345
Shared language between home and host country (1=yes) [n=12,792]	28.1%	44.9%
Colonial tie between home and host country (1=yes) [n=12,792]	28.2%	45.0%

Table A.3: The Native-Migrant Job Autonomy Gap for Selected Migrants

Dependent = Job autonomy	Acculturation		Home-country economic development		Shared language and/or past colonial ties	
	Model A.1	Model A.2	Model A.3	Model A.4	Model A.5	Model A.6
Migrant & living in host country for more than 10 years (1=yes)	-.106*** (.010)	-	-	-	-	-
Migrant & living in host country for 5 years or less (1=yes)	-	-.259*** (.023)	-	-	-	-
Migrant & host-country is high-income (1=yes)	-	-	-.037*** (.013)	-	-	-
Migrant & host-country is not high-income (1=yes)	-	-	-	-.190*** (.011)	-	-
Migrant & either shared language or past colonial ties (1=yes)	-	-	-	-	-.053*** (.013)	-
Migrant & neither shared language nor past colonial ties (1=yes)	-	-	-	-	-	-.191*** (.011)
Standard control variables	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
No. of observations	148,375	139,874	142,733	146,512	143,378	145,826
No. of natives	138,206	138,206	138,206	138,206	138,206	138,206
No. of migrants	10,169	1,668	4,527	8,306	5,172	7,620
R^2	.2570	.2597	.2597	.2575	.2581	.2591

Notes: The cutoff point for high-income, economically advanced home country is set at an average per-capita income level of $12,736 (purchasing power parity), which is the World Bank's current cutoff point for high-income countries. The dependent variable is standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Standard control variables are gender, hours worked per week, years of education, average job autonomy in individual's industry, percentage foreign-born employees in individual's industry, dummies for employment relation, dummies for educational degree, dummies for employment status, age and age squared, host-country dummies, and year/wave dummies (see Table 2). Standard errors (in parentheses) are robust standard errors. *, ** and *** denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.

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